Unethical acts and reported cases of corruption and commercial crimes in South African business are increasing. Literature studies showed that risk groups (for instance South African managers in affirmative action positions) are functioning in a stressful environment which can give rise to unethical acts. Results pointed out that high stress correlates substantially with: to claim credit for a subordinate's work; to fail to report a co-worker's violation of company policy, to offer potential clients fully paid holidays; and to purchase shares (...) upon hearing privileged company information. In the light of this a number of recommendations were made. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has now well and truly established itself as one of the main normative theories. It is now quite common, and indeed, expected, for virtue ethics to be included, alongside deontology and consequentialism, in any Moral Philosophy syllabus worth its salt. Students are typically introduced to virtue ethics only after studying the other two normative theories, and this often sets the scene for various sorts of misunderstandings, with students expecting virtue ethics to be based on the same set of (...) rules and assumptions as its rivals. Or at least, that is my experience. In this paper I want to focus on one such misunderstanding, which arises when trying to apply virtue ethics to our judgments of other people’s actions and behaviour. Although there are countless ways in which a theory can be misunderstood, it is worth guarding against this one in particular, given that it can lead someone who takes virtue ethics seriously to act in ways that are not virtuous, or even vicious. I begin by making a few remarks about the role of normative theory, and then go on to give four examples of how applying virtue ethics can lead to poor behaviour. In the final section I identify the mistake in question and conclude by noting how it can be avoided. (shrink)

It has become common to distinguish between altruistic and commercial contract motherhood (or ‘surrogacy’). Altruistic arrangements are based on the ‘gift relationship’: a woman is motivated by altruism to have a baby for an infertile couple, who are free to reciprocate as they see fit. By contrast, in commercial arrangements both parties are motivated by personal gain to enter a legally enforceable agreement, which stipulates that the contract mother or ‘surrogate’ is to bear a child for the intending parents in (...) exchange for a fee. She is required to undergo medical examinations and to refrain from behaviour that could harm the foetus. The intending parents are the child's legal parents from the outset. The parties to the contract can, but are not expected to, maintain contact after the transaction is completed. We argue that contract motherhood should not be organized according to the norms of the gift relationship, and that contract mothers should be compensated for their labour. However, we accept that there are good reasons for rejecting the commercial model as a suitable framework for contract pregnancy, and argue, instead, in favour of viewing it as a profession. (shrink)

Qualified-agent virtue ethics provides an account of right action in terms of the virtuous agent. It has become one of the most popular, but also most frequently criticized versions of virtue ethics. Many of the objections rest on the mistaken assumption that proponents of qualified-agent virtue ethics share the same view when it comes to fundamental questions about the meaning of the term ‘right action’ and the function of an account of right action. My aim in this paper is not (...) to defend qualified-agent virtue ethics but to correct this misunderstanding, and this will hopefully leave us in a better position to evaluate it. (shrink)

A discussion of three virtue -ethical accounts of right action: a qualified-agent account, agent-based account, and a target-centred account.

This volume provides a clear and accessible overview of central concepts, positions, and arguments in virtue ethics. While it focuses primarily on Aristotelian virtue ethics, it also includes discussion of alternative forms of virtue ethics and competing normative theories. The first six chapters are organized around central questions in normative ethics that are of particular concern to virtue ethicists and their critics: -/-  What is virtue ethics?  What makes a trait a virtue?  Is there a link between (...) virtue and happiness?  What is involved in being well-motivated?  What is practical wisdom?  What makes an action right? -/- The last four chapters focus on important challenges or objections to virtue ethics: -/-  Can virtue ethics be applied to particular moral problems?  Does virtue ethics ultimately rely on moral principles?  Can it withstand the situationist critique?  What are the prospects for an environmental virtue ethics? -/- With useful Summaries and Further Reading sections at the end of each chapter, the book is written for advanced undergraduates, but should also be useful to graduate students, professional philosophers, and anyone interested in normative ethics, applied ethics, moral psychology, or moral education. (shrink)

A critical discussion of Christine Swanton's target-centred account of right action.

Surrogate motherhood is treated as a form of adoption in many countries: the birth mother and her partner are presumed to be the parents of the child, while the intended parents have to adopt the baby once it is born. Other than compensation for expenses related to the pregnancy, payment to surrogates is not permitted. We believe that the failure to compensate surrogate mothers for their labour as well as the significant risks they undertake is both unfair and exploitative. We (...) accept that introducing payment for surrogates would create a significant tension in the adoption model. However, we recommend rejecting the adoption model altogether rather than continuing to prohibit compensation to surrogates. (shrink)

Reproductive techniques and practices, ranging from ordinary birth-control measures and artificial insemination to embryo transfer and surrogate motherhood, have greatly enhanced our range of reproductive choices. As a consequence, they pose a number of difficult moral and legal questions with regard to the formation of a family and our conception of parenthood. A view that is becoming increasingly common is that parental rights and responsibilities should not be based on genetic relationships but should instead be seen as arising from agreements (...) or contracts between individuals. Accordingly, a man who consents to his wife's artificial insemination by donor (AID) and not the sperm donor, is the legal father of the child; in surrogacy agreements, the intending mother, and not the surrogate, has the right to raise the resulting child. While agreeing that biology should not form the basis for assigning legal parenthood, I argue that the theory of intentional parenthood, despite being put forward as a liberal theory, is geared toward or will have the function of protecting the nuclear family and inhibiting the formation of alternative family forms. (shrink)

In ‘Against agent-based virtue ethics' (2004) Michael Brady rejects agent-based virtue ethics on the grounds that it fails to capture the commonsense distinction between an agent's doing the right thing, and her doing it for the right reason. In his view, the failure to account for this distinction has paradoxical results, making it unable to explain why an agent has a duty to perform a given action. I argue that Brady's objection relies on the assumption that an agent-based account is (...) committed to defining obligations in terms of actual motives. If we reject this view, and instead provide a version of agent-basing that determines obligations in terms of the motives of the hypothetical virtuous agent, the paradox disappears. (shrink)

A tragic dilemma is thought to arise when an agent, through no fault of her own, finds herself in a situation where she must choose between two courses of action, both of which it would be wrong to undertake. I focus on tragic dilemmas that are resolvable, that is, where a reason can be given in favour of one course of action over another, and my aim is to examine whether Hursthouse's virtue-ethical account of right action succeeds in avoiding two (...) problems presented by tragic dilemmas. The first of these is that they produce the seemingly contradictory conclusion that an agent, in doing what she ought to do, acts wrongly, making it appropriate for her to feel guilt. The second is the paradox of moral luck, which consists in the conflict between the intuition that an agent cannot be held responsible for actions that are not fully voluntary, and the fact that she may nevertheless believe that she has done something morally reprehensible. I argue that if we accept Hursthouse's separation of action guidance and action assessment, her account succeeds in solving the problem of contradiction. However, it does not completely avoid the problem of moral luck. I argue, against Hursthouse, that the virtuous agent can emerge from a tragic dilemma having acted well, and that this is the conclusion we must arrive at if we want to avoid the problem of contradiction and of moral luck. (shrink)

South Africa is characterised by rapidly escalating crime, including white-collar crime, and unethical behaviour in public and private organisations. This necessitates innovative ways to deal with the situation. The objective of this conceptual and theoretical research is to investigate ways in which human resource management can be utilised to instil and develop an ethical corporate culture in South African organisations. A theoretical model of ethical behaviour is discussed as a basis for this study. It is indicated that human resource management (...) can have an effect on organisational factors and is therefore an important tool in developing an ethical corporate culture. (shrink)

. “Normal” Prisons in an “abnormal” society? A comparative perspective on South African prison law and practice. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 37-51. doi: 10.1080/0731129X.1987.9991816.

Some philosophers believe that a change in motive alone is sometimes sufficient to bring about a change in the deontic status (rightness or wrongness) of an action. I refer to this position as ‘weak motivism’, and distinguish it from ‘strong’ and ‘partial motivism’. I examine a number of cases where our intuitive judgements appear to support the weak motivist’s thesis, and argue that in each case an alternative explanation can be given for why a change in motive brings about (or, (...) in some cases, appears to bring about) a change in deontic status. (shrink)

The COVID-19 lockdown has significantly disrupted the higher education environment within the Netherlands and led to changes in available study-related resources and study demands of students. These changes in study resources and study demands, the uncertainty and confusion about educational activities, the developing fear and anxiety about the disease, and the implementation of the COVID-19 lockdown measures may have a significant impact on the mental health of students. As such, this study aimed to investigate the trajectory patterns, rate of change, (...) and longitudinal associations between study resources–demands and mental health of 141 university students from the Netherlands before and during the COVID-19 lockdown. The present study employed a longitudinal design and a piecewise latent growth modeling strategy to investigate the changes in study resources and mental health over a 3 month period. The results showed that moderate levels of student resources significantly decreased before, followed by a substantial rate of increase during, lockdown. In contrast, study demands and mental health were reported to be moderate and stable throughout the study. Finally, the growth trajectories of study resources–demands and mental health were only associated before the lockdown procedures were implemented. Despite growing concerns relating to the negative psychological impact of COVID-19 on students, our study shows that the mental health during the initial COVID-19 lockdown remained relatively unchanged. (shrink)

In this chapter I consider two questions about action evaluation: Is it the central task of normative ethics to concern itself with action evaluation?, and When it does concern itself with action evaluation, should its focus be on developing an account of right and wrong action, as opposed to, say, good and bad action? I argue that for virtue ethicists, the task of providing an account of right action is not of central importance, and that the strength of virtue ethics (...) lies in the fact that it allows us to evaluate actions in terms of a rich aretaic vocabulary. In the second half of the chapter I propose a “relaxed” virtue-ethical account of right action, which denies that rightness is a particular quality shared by all actions appropriately referred to as “right,” and acknowledges that the meaning of “right action” differs from one context to another. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the questions “What does it mean to be a surrogate mother?” and “What would be an appropriate perspective for a surrogate mother to have on her pregnancy?” In response to the objection that such contracts are alienating or dehumanising since they require women to suppress their evolving perspective on their pregnancies, liberal supporters of surrogate motherhood argue that the freedom to contract includes the freedom to enter a contract to bear a child for an infertile (...) couple. After entering the contract the surrogate may not be free to interpret her pregnancy as that of a non-surrogate mother, but there is more than one appropriate way of interpreting one's pregnancy. To restrict or ban surrogacy contracts would be to prohibit women from making other particular interpretations of their pregnancies they may wish to make, requiring them to live up to a culturally constituted image of ideal motherhood. We examine three interpretations of a “surrogate pregnancy” that are implicit in the views and arguments put forward by ethicists, surrogacy agencies, and surrogate mothers themselves. We hope to show that our concern in this regard goes beyond the view that surrogacy contracts deny or suppress the natural, instinctive or conventional interpretation of pregnancy. (shrink)

A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that positive emotions, engagement, relationships, meaning, and accomplishments may be a robust framework for the measurement, management and development of wellbeing. While the original PERMA framework made great headway in the past decade, its empirical and theoretical limitations were recently identified and critiqued. In response, Seligman clarified the value of PERMA as a framework for and not a theory of wellbeing and called for further research to expand the construct. To expand the framework (...) into organizational contexts, recent meta-analyses and systematic literature reviews showed that physical health, mindset, physical work environments and economic security could be seen as essential contextually relevant building blocks for work-related wellbeing and are therefore prime candidates to expand the PERMA framework for use within organizational contexts. Through expanding the original PERMA framework with these four factors, a new holistic approach to work-related wellbeing and work performance was born: the PERMA+4. As such, the purpose of this brief perspective paper is to provide a conceptual overview of PERMA+4 as holistic framework for work-related wellbeing and work performance which extends beyond the predominant componential thinking of the discipline. Specifically, we aim to do so by providing: a brief historical overview of the development of PERMA as a theory for wellbeing, a conceptual overview of PERMA+4 as a holistic framework for work-related wellbeing and work performance, empirical evidence supporting the usefulness of PERMA+4, and charting a course for the second wave of positive organizational psychological research. (shrink)

Since the publication of Judith Thomson’s 1976 paper, solving the Trolley Problem has been a favourite preoccupation of utilitarians and deontologists: Is there a general moral principle that can explain or support our conflicting intuitions in the Bystander and Footbridge cases? Why is it permissible to divert a runaway trolley, thereby killing one person to save five others, but impermissible to push a big man onto a track to save five others? I briefly discuss the reasons why virtue ethicists tend (...) to avoid the Trolley Debate and then, with a few reservations and qualifications in place, go on to argue that a virtue ethicist can support our common-sense intuitions in the Bystander and Footbridge cases while also offering a response to Thomson’s Loop Challenge. (shrink)